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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The  relationship  between  growth  in  monetary  aggregates  and  price  changes 
continues to be a subject of considerable debate both in the academic and policy 
circles. Whereas the more ‘conservative’ policy makers hold that growth in monetary 
aggregates bear proportionately on prices, ‘liberals’ on the other hand suggest a 
fairly  weak  relationship  and  instead  mainly  attribute  sustained  price  changes  to 
other innovations (including structural weaknesses and poor productive capacity).  
 
This study employed vector autoregression techniques (and its variants) to examine 
both short term as well as long term interactions between selected macroeconomic 
aggregates with  particular focus on the relationship between money growth and 
price  changes.  Results  from  both  the  reduced  form  vector  autoregression 
specification  and  the  contemporaneous  structural  vector  autoregression  show  a 
weak causation from growth in monetary aggregates to price changes, but the link 
between changes in monetary aggregates and prices becomes stronger in the long 
run. The results also point to a strong relationship between price changes on the one 
hand and exchange rate depreciation, and past inflation outcomes on the other. The 
results imply a potential for increased revenue from monetisation, at least up to 
some  feasible  as  well  as  the  need  to  focus  on  other  possible  sources  of  price 
variations.  
 
In general, whereas it is possible for the relationship between prices and money to 
weaken, budget deficits beyond ‘certain financeable limits’ will clearly negate the 
possibility of attaining other objectives of macroeconomic policy. A natural concern 
that arises in such a context is one of sustainability and compatibility of the budget 
deficit  with  other  macroeconomic  targets.  We  also  employed  the  government 
budget accounting  framework to  analyse  sustainability of Uganda’s current  fiscal 
stance.  
 
The results show that the consolidated deficit is consistent with attainment of target 
outcomes for other macroeconomic variables, most notably the rates of inflation 
and GDP growth rates. The inflation target has however, been achieved at the cost of 
an unsustainable domestic debt.  
 
From a policy perspective, issuing domestic debt at such a high real interest rates will 
allow  lower  money  growth  but  at  the  cost  of  future  increases  in  debt  service 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Central  banks  usually  employ  tools  of  monetary  policy  to  ensure  price  stability. 
Attainment of stable price outcomes is considered to be a crucial goal of economic 
policy  because  it  provides  ‘a  conducive  environment’  for  proper  functioning  of  the 
economy
1,  resulting  in  high  rates  of  growth  and,  ultimately  improved  welfare.  In  a 
number of typical settings, the tools of monetary policy employed have their theoretical 
underpinnings in the classical dichotomy hypothesis.  
 
A  common  practical  tool  of  monetary  policy  involves  determining  the  desired  and 
appropriate level of growth in monetary aggregates that are required to support the 
market determined outcomes of GDP growth rates and levels of employment among 
others (Issing, 1997). In this case a stable money multiplier relationship is assumed to 
provide the link between monetary base and the broad monetary aggregates (Sriram 
2001).  The  actual  policy  stance  is  then  dictated  by  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
deviation.  
 
The arguments contained in the classical dichotomy hypothesis clearly suggest a very 
weak link between monetary and real factors of the economy. Monetary policy only 
supports the growth process in an indirect way, in line with the classical thinking of 
perfect  and  well  functioning  markets  (see  Cochrane,  1998  and  Swanson,  1998  for 
complete analyses of whether money matters). Hence, whereas there is no dispute that 
price stability is crucial for the proper functioning of the economy, it is possible that the 
process of monetary policy implementation might under certain circumstances
2 result in 
realisation of outcomes that are less than the economy’s full growth potential.  
 
It is this apparently weak transmission of monetary impulses to the real sector of the 
economy,  together  with  a  relatively  weak  private  sector  in  much  of  the  developing 
world that has tended to make governments faced with challenges of development and 
recovery  to  resort  to  pursuance  of  a  more  active  fiscal  policy.  The  counterpart  to 
financing these expenditures in the face of a narrow domestic revenue base is the fiscal 
deficit (see for instance Haque and Montiel 1989; Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 1991). The 
public finance view of inflation suggests that it is recourse to money creation in the face 
of such deficits that explains episodes of sustained inflation (Sargent and Wallace 1981; 
Agenor and Montiel 1999).  
 
In a bid to try and avoid negative consequences associated with monetisation of the 
deficit, many countries in the developing world have had to increasingly rely on foreign 
aid inflows (Adam, 2009). Unfortunately though, as the foreign resources are converted 
                                                 
1 Highly variable prices increase risk and may impede long term planning and investment, among other 
negative effects. 
2 This may be the case, for instance, with a relatively weak private sector or even when the competition 
structure obtaining in a particular context is different than that of perfect competition that is assumed in the 
classical settings.   3
into local currency domestic money stock increases in excess of target levels which piles 
upward pressure on prices, with effects similar to those of monetisation (Brownbridge 
and Mutebile, 2006; Buffie et al., 2009). This comes at a cost and raises concerns about 
sustainability of deficits and management of other macroeconomic variables. Studies 
here  (Berg  et  al.,  2007;  Foster  and  Killick,  2006)  recount  a  cycle  of  confusion  and 
frequent policy shifts aimed at minimizing macroeconomic costs. According to Buffie et 
al,  (2009)  typically  the  policy  cycle  starts  with  the  central  bank  buying  up  large 
quantities of aid dollars in an effort to stabilize the exchange rate. The rapid increase in 
the  monetary  base  and  the  boom  in  aid  spending,  however,  create  fears  of  higher 
inflation. Striving to reassert monetary discipline, the authorities sterilize capital inflows 
with bond sales only to see real interest rates and the cost of internal debt service rise 
sharply. So policy shifts again. To reduce the interest rates without losing control of 
money supply, the central bank suspends bond sales and withdraws from the exchange 
market. But this leads back to square one. In Uganda for example, evidence suggests 
that  the  cost  of  conducting  monetary  policy  has  been  relatively  (and  probably 
inefficiently) high (Adam, 2009).  
 
On the other side of the debate is the argument that the relationship between money 
supply  and  inflation  may  under  certain  circumstances  become  relatively  weaker 
(Christensen,  2001  and  Schonwitz,  2004).    This  may  be  the  case  during  periods  of 
recovery such that modest increases in money supply instead works to ease supply side 
constraints, in which case it may not necessarily have a proportionate bearing on prices. 
In addition, proponents of the somewhat weak money-price relationship point to the 
crucial  role  of  other  structural  rigidities  in  driving  prices  and  also  argue  that  for 
economies operating below full employment, these increased resources might indeed 
improve the productive capacity of the economy. Sowa (1994) for instance studied the 
inflationary process in Ghana and concluded that inflation, both in the long run or short 
run, was influenced more by output volatility than by monetary factors. Kia (2006) on 
the other hand examined the internal and external factors that account for inflation rate 
in Iran for the period 1970 – 2002 and suggested that in the long run, exchange rate 
depreciations were the underlying causes of inflation. Roya and Darbhaa (2000) used 
data from India for the period 1970 to 1990 and established that structural factors, in 
addition to monetary factors, play an important role in generating and sustaining the 
process of inflation and fluctuations in economic activity. This led them to conclude that 
a simple monetary targeting without adequate ‘supply side’ measures may not be able 
to serve the objective of maintaining growth with price stability. Christensen (2001) in 
his  analysis  of  the  effect  of  real  supply  shocks  on  the  money  growth  –  inflation 
relationship for the US concluded that short run price changes were the result of global 
real supply shocks. 
 
Clearly then, the precise and exact nature of the response of prices to money supply 
during periods of recovery and at levels below full employment can not be fully known a 
priori.  
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In general, whereas it is possible for the relationship between prices and money to 
weaken,  budget  deficits  beyond  ‘certain  financeable  limits’  will  clearly  negate  the 
possibility  of  attaining  other  objectives  of  macroeconomic  policy  (van  Wijnbergen, 
1990). Sowa’s (1994) analysis of fiscal sustainability in Ghana showed that fiscal policy 
was consistent in 1985 and 1989 whereas government did not maintain consistent fiscal 
deficits between 1986-1988, and inflation in these years was well above targets. Van 
Wijnbergen and Budina (2002) on the other hand analyse the consistency between fiscal 
deficits and inflation targets in Poland and show consistency between inflation targets 
and fiscal policy for the year 1992, but only on the account of low market interest rates 
on  external  debt.  Buffie  et  al.  (2009)  show  that  deficit  reduction  results  in  lower 
inflation in the long run. A natural concern that arises then is one of sustainability and 
compatibility of the budget deficit with other macroeconomic targets.  
 
It is in context of the foregoing that this study contributes to the literature. First, 
informs current debate whether there is room for increasing the fiscal space in view of 
macroeconomic costs. Second, provides evidence from Uganda on the relationship 
between monetary aggregates and price variability. And lastly, ascertains the health of 
Uganda’s fiscal policy. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides a framework for 
analysing fiscal policy consistency. Section three formally analyses the consistency fiscal 
policy in Uganda, while section four uses a structural vector autoregressive approach 
(SVAR) to analyse the interaction of selected macroeconomic aggregates. Section five 
provides policy recommendations and concludes the paper.   5
2  A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING CONSISTENCY OF FISCAL POLICY 
 
There are two major formal approaches normally employed to ascertain sustainability of 
a  given  fiscal  policy;  the  accounting  and  present  value  constraint  approaches.  The 
accounting approach is based on the government budget identity, and sustainability of a 
primary deficit or surplus is measured by its capability to generate a constant debt/GDP 
ratio  given  a  growth  target.  The  approach  that  we  adopted  to  analyse  fiscal  policy 
consistency is based on the works of Anand and van Wijnbergen (1989) and Budina and 
van Wijnbergen (2001). 
 
The thrust of this approach entails consolidation of ‘other’ public sector deficits with the 
central bank accounts to determine  ‘financeable’ levels of the  deficit,  given existing 
targets of inflation and sustainable internal and external borrowing. As a starting point, 
this approach incorporates the central bank
3 into the basic public sector budget identity 
which shows both the financing requirements and the sources of financing.  
 
( ) W N C D E B B E NFA B i iB D g & & & & − + + = − + +
* * * * ,        1) 
where, 
D  =  non-interest deficit  
i  =  nominal domestic interest rate 
* i   =  nominal foreign interest rate 
B   =  domestic debt stock 
* B   =  foreign debt stock 
* NFA   =  net foreign assets 
E   =  exchange rate (domestic in terms of foreign units) 
B &   =  change in domestic debt stock 
* B &   =  change in foreign debt stock 
g C D &   =  net credit to government 
W N &   =  change in central banks net worth 
 
The basic identity shows that the deficit can be financed by issuing domestic and foreign 
debt, and through central bank advances to government. In order to consolidate the 
central  government  and  the  central  bank  into  the  overall  deficit,  we  incorporate  a 
simplified  central  bank  profit  and  loss  account  into  the  definition  of  the  basic 
government  budget  constraint  by  deducting  central  bank  profits  from  the  financing 
requirements. The counterpart of this modification is the change in net worth which is 
reflected as part of the sources of funding. Since the central bank typically changes its 
net  foreign  assets  to  finance  debt  payment,  changes  in  net  foreign  assets  is  also 
deducted from the right hand side
4,  
 
                                                 
3 This is captured through a simplified profit and loss account of the central bank. 
4 Notice that it is also at the same time added back to maintain equality.   6
( ) ( ) W N E A F N C D E A F N B B E NFA B i iB D g & & & & & & − + + − + = − + +
* * * * * * .  2) 
Using  the  definition  of  changes  in  base  money
5,  W N E A F N C D M g & & & − + =
*   this 
expression can equivalently be written as, 
 
( ) ( ) M E A F N B B E NFA B i iB D & & & & + − + = − + +
* * * * * .        3) 
Adjusting for inflation and considering only real changes 
 
( )( ) ( ) P M e nfa b b e nfa b e r rb d ∆ + − ∆ + ∆ = − + + +
* * * * * ˆ       4) 
where the lower case letters are the real counterparts of the nominal values,  e ˆ is the 
changes in the exchange rate which is part of the cost of debt servicing and  
 
m m P M π + ∆ = ∆                 5) 
This can be interpreted to mean that the real value of consolidated deficit should equal 
the financing from both domestic and foreign sources and revenue from inflation tax 
and  seignorage.  In  order  to  calculate  the  financeable  deficit,  one  has  to  take  into 
consideration the dynamics of the debt process. A quite simple and commonly used 
debt strategy suggests that debt should not grow faster than the resources available for 
its financing,  
 
, nb b = ∆  and  ( ) ( )( ), ˆ
* * * * nfa b e n e nfa b − − = − ∆  
This can be substituted into (4) to derive the consolidated financeable deficit. 
 
( )( ) ( ) P M e nfa b b e nfa b e r rb d ∆ + − ∆ + ∆ = − + + +
* * * * * ˆ       6) 
 
The consolidated debt and real payments is defined as changes in the real value of 
domestic and foreign debt, plus revenue from seignorage and from inflation tax.  
 
The  consolidated  ‘financeable’  deficit  can  then  be  obtained  by  incorporating  the 
particular assumptions adopted about the debt strategy, 
( ) ( )( ) m nm nfa b e n nb e nfa b r rb d π + + − − + = − + +
* * * * * ˆ .      7) 
 
The ‘financeable’ deficit thus defines the level of consolidated deficit that is consistent 
with attainment of target outcomes for other macroeconomic variables, most notably 
the rates of inflation and GDP growth rates. Thus, if actual deficit exceeds sustainable 
levels,  then  one  of  the  non  fiscal  targets  would  have  to  be  abandoned  or  at  the 
minimum fiscal policy would need to be adjusted. 
                                                 
5 Base money may be issued to finance advances to government, to accumulate net foreign assets in so far 
as these are not already financed by the net worth of the central bank.    7
3.  ANALYZING THE CONSISTENCY OF FISCAL POLICY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This section employs the specification in equation (7) to calculate the financeable level 
of  the  deficit  in  Uganda.  Estimates  of  the  sustainable  deficits  are  derived  from  the 
specification  in  (7)  by  holding  constant  the  ratios  of  public  liabilities  to  output  for 
feasible values of the macroeconomic variables that determine market demands for 
public liabilities. In addition, we also undertake simulations of different macroeconomic 
policy scenarios and present their likely effects on the level of deficit financing. 
 
In  order  to  calculate  the  value  of  the  consolidated  financeable  deficit,  we  start  by 
undertaking an econometric estimation of demand for money. Parameters from the 
money demand specification are then used to calculate revenues from inflation tax and 
seigniorage. These  are then  used  with  values  of  other  variables  in  the  consolidated 
deficit equation to calculate the financeable deficit.  
 
3.2  Definition and measurement of selected variables 
Estimation of a money demand function requires careful selection of the appropriate 
definition of money to be used in analysing deficit finance and inflation tax revenue. 
Indeed, revenue derived from inflationary erosion of the private sector’s deposits in the 
banking system that is offset by inflationary erosion of loans outstanding to the private 
sector does not increase net revenue. This rules out the possibility of using the broad 
definition  of  money  (M2)  since  it  has  an  ‘inside  money’  component  (see  van 
Wijnbergen, 1990). The proper definition should instead include base money or ‘outside 
money’ (M2 less private sector claims). In Uganda, base money is defined as commercial 
banks’ deposits at Bank of Uganda (BoU), plus currency issued and commercial banks’ 
holdings  of  BoU  securities  (BoU,  2006). However,  in  practice  central  banks  in  many 
countries not only hold reserves from commercial banks but also lend to them. This 
requires adjustment in the definition of base money so that it coincides with the central 
bank’s  net  liabilities  to  the  private  sector.  This  adjusted  monetary  base  is  the 
appropriate concept to use for calculations of consistency of fiscal deficits with levels of 
inflation tax (van Wijnbergen, 1990). 
 
Using the adjusted monetary base definition of money has an important consequence 
for the measurement of the public foreign debt. If all the central bank’s liabilities (base 
money)  are  construed  as  public  liabilities,  then  the  central  bank’s  claims  on 
nongovernmental agents, correspondingly, must be subtracted from the public sector’s 
debt. Thus, public foreign debt needs to be measured net of the central bank’s foreign 
assets. 
 
In a steady state, the revenue from seignorage equals the economy’s growth rate g 
times  the  adjusted  monetary  base  m.  The  sum  of  revenue  from  inflation  tax  and   8
seignorage equals revenue from monetization. Outside the steady state there could be 
other sources of revenue from monetization including one-time changes in real money 
stock because of changes in inflation, interest rates, or financial innovations that shift 
money demand. 
The other practical problem that arises is the choice of the appropriate interest rate on 
foreign  debt.  This  is  especially  so  because  most  of  Uganda’s  debt  is  obtained  on 
concessional terms. For instance, 80 percent of Uganda’s foreign borrowing carries a 
0.75 percent interest with a 40 year maturity and 10 year grace period, whereas the 
remaining 20 percent is borrowed at 2 percent interest over a 23 year period maturity 
with  6  years  grace  period.  In  addition,  due  to  low  absorptive  capacity  of  loans 
committed, the country has paid a commitment penalty of 0.35 percent on World Bank 
and  African  Development  Bank  loans.  Hence  the  appropriate  interest  rate  variable 
should account for all these realities. However, for simplicity and data availability this 
study  uses  a  calculated  implicit  average  interest  rate  on  foreign  debt  derived  from 
actual interest payment.  
 
A fairly recent development has been Uganda’s qualification for the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative in 1998 and 2000 which enabled the country to become 
eligible for debt write-offs. In 2006, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) saw 
Uganda receive a write off of 100 percent of eligible debt owed to the World Bank, the 
IMF and the African Development Bank (AfDB)
6. This lowered Uganda’s stock of external 
public debt from US$4.5 billion at end 2005/06 to US$1.5 billion at end 2006/07. The 
HIPC relief on average reduced actual principal and interest payments by 44.32 percent 
and 46.64 percent respectively during the period 2000/01 and 2007/08. The highest 
reduction of actual principal payments as a result of HIPC relief was in FY2002/03 while 
the lowest was in 2007/08. As for the interest payments, the highest reduction was 
realised in 2003/04 (Appendix Table 3). 
 
3.3  Debt strategy and macroeconomic restrictions 
Solvency considerations or other management  objectives and macroeconomic policy 
objectives  such  as  targets  for  inflation  and  real  growth  lead  to  restrictions  on  the 
sources of financing. The financeable deficit equals the maximum obtainable from the 
sources of financing given the restrictions. 
 
The precise point where debt levels begin to threaten solvency is of course difficult to 
determine and anyhow willingness to pay may cut in earlier since (political) willingness 
to pay may be less than the ability to pay. A conservative approach would take current 
debt-output ratios as a benchmark. If at current levels the government still has access to 
capital markets, then at least the market’s assessment is that at current levels the debt 
is within the limits set by ability and willingness to pay. It is moreover reasonable to take 
                                                 
6 For the IMF and the African Development Fund, eligible debt comprised all outstanding amounts 
disbursed prior to 31
st December 2004. The applicable date for IDA was 31
st December 2003.   9
debt-output  levels  rather  than  absolute  levels  as  a  benchmark  since  capacity  to 
generate tax revenue is clearly closely related to the aggregate level of output. In view 
of this, domestic and (net) foreign debt should not grow faster than the real resources 


























nfa fd ) (
*
) (
.    (8) 
 
Equation  (8)  indicates  the  restrictions  on  debt  issue  if  the  conservative  approach  is 
chosen and debt–output ratios kept constant. This analysis can accommodate different 
debt strategies; however, for simplicity the study adopts this conservative approach. 
Hence with debt policy defined in terms of target debt output ratios, debt should not in 
real terms grow faster than real GDP growth rate g.  
 
Uganda’s  macroeconomic  management  is  geared  to  the  goal  of  price  stability  and 
monetary policy is geared to attaining inflation of no more than 5 percent. For the 
exchange rate variable, government recognizes its impact on exports and the central 
bank usually intervenes in the market to ensure its orderly movement. The central bank 
also appears on the market to sterilize the effect of donor financing on money supply. 
Generally, it signals the direction of the market determined exchange rate in view of the 
fundamentals. Like the exchange rate variable, the interest rate variable is also market 
determined.  However,  the  challenge  for  macroeconomic  management  has  been  the 
monetary policy effects through domestic borrowing on overall interest rates. 
   10
3.4  Analysis of fiscal policy consistency 
3.4.1  Real Quasi-Fiscal Deficits 
Table 1 presents calculations of the quasi-fiscal deficit consolidating government and 
central  bank  accounts  for  the  1993-2006  period.  These  deficits  are  calculated  by 
excluding  the  inflationary  component  of  all  public  sector  liabilities,  except  for  the 
change in monetary financing from nominal deficits. The real quasi-fiscal deficit for the 
central bank is accumulated either through an increase in its foreign currency liabilities 
or through an increase in base money. For analytical purposes, the period is subdivided 
into three and then the average covering the whole liberalization period is considered. 
The deficits were calculated from the financing side by considering increases in liabilities 
of the consolidated government. The average is used as a base case scenario for the 
analysis that follows. 
 
Table 1: Real Quasi Deficits (% of GDP) 
 
PERIOD  1993-1997  1998-2002  2003-2006  1993-2006 
Primary Deficit  1.85  1.70  1.06  1.55 
Deficit  3.27  2.59  2.27  2.74 
Interest Payments  1.42  0.89  1.21  1.19 
Real Domestic Interest Payments  0.06  0.36  0.53  0.32 
Real Foreign Net Debt Interest Payments  1.37  0.54  0.68  0.87 
Real Domestic Debt  1.35  4.39  9.51  4.77 
Real Foreign Debt  68.38  51.81  57.67  59.40 
Real Foreign Net Debt  69.72  44.96  44.13  53.56 
Real Public Debt (Excl. NFA)  69.73  56.21  67.18  64.17 
Net Real Public Debt   71.07  49.35  53.64  58.33 
Real Domestic Interest  3.51  6.41  5.71  5.17 
Real Foreign Interest  1.88  1.41  1.69  1.66 
Domestic Debt Financing   0.55  1.79  1.52  1.15 
Foreign Financing  1.83  -0.43  0.02  0.75 
Monetization  0.89  1.23  0.71  0.91 
Source: Computed 
 
The figures suggest that for the period 1993-1997 domestic debt financing of the deficit 
stood at a dismal 0.6 percent of GDP; with the bulk of financing coming in from foreign 
sources.  However,  this  trend  changed  over  the  1998-2002  period  where  domestic 
financing peaked at about 1.8 percent of GDP. This has happened even in the face of the 
fact  that  starting  1993,  Uganda  suspended  use  of  domestic  debt  as  a  source  of 
financing, reserving it for purposes of liquidity management only. Hence the liquidity 
management  pressures  stemming  from  increased  donor  grant  inflows  on  the 
sustainability of domestic debt are evident. Indeed, the need to mop up excess liquidity   11
has led to a fivefold growth in domestic debt from 1.4 percent of GDP for the period 
1993-1997 to 9.5 percent of GDP in 2003-2006.  
 
The real foreign debt on the other hand has declined from 68.4 percent in the 1993-
1997 period to 57.7 percent during 2003-2006 reflecting an increase in grants and debt 
relief  from  the  HIPC  Initiative  and  the  recent  Multilateral  Debt  Relief  International 
(MDRI). 
 
Though the overall deficit excluding grants has increased, the real net operational deficit 
of government has actually reduced from 3.3 percent in the period 1993-1997 to 2.3 
percent in the 2003-2006 period. This reduction has been due to increased foreign grant 
aid which has reduced the real deficit when net liability of the consolidated government 
is  considered.  Unfortunately  though,  increased  reliance  on  donor  support  has 
complicated  macroeconomic  management.  As  a  result  for  instance,  real  domestic 
interest rates have increased from an average of 3.5 percent in 1993-1997 period to 
peak  at  6.4  percent  for  the  1998-2002  period.  This  provides  a  challenge  to 
macroeconomic  management  in  the  face  of  providing  a  private  sector  investment 
friendly environment. 
 
To  assess  whether  these  deficits  have  been  compatible  with  inflation  targets,  the 
financeable  deficit  is  derived  and  is  compared  with  the  calculated  actual  deficits. 
However, monetary financing is important in deriving the financeable deficit. Hence, to 
analyze monetary financing potential of the economy, the next sub-section analyzes the 
inflation Luffer curve based on the demand for money specification for Uganda. 
3.4.2  Inflation and Revenue from Monetization 
Using  the  estimated  money  demand  coefficients  (appended  in  annex  1  and  2),  the 
impact of inflation on base money, seignorage and inflation tax revenues
7 is discussed. 
As a baseline case scenario the average during the period 1993-2006 is used in the 
simulated  model.  The  aim  here  is  to  demonstrate  the  approximated  limit 
macroeconomic management has in attaining revenue from monetization. 
 
Table 2, summarizes the inflation Luffer curve shape of inflation tax and revenue from 
monetization. The Table presents the estimated base money, inflation tax, seignorage 
revenue  and  revenue  from  monetization  for  a  given  inflation  rate.  Any  rise  in  the 
inflation rate (inflation tax rate) causes the real monetary base (inflation tax base) to 
fall. At low inflation rates an increase in the inflation tax rate increases revenue as a 
percentage of GDP. However, it reduces the tax base. 
 
 
                                                 
7 It should be noted though that inflation tax revenue is as of now not a conscious objective of deficit 
financing in Uganda and when it occurs, it is mainly a side effect underlying in the policy framework.   12
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0  5.39  0.34  0.00  0.34 
5  5.36  0.34  0.25  0.59 
7  5.34  0.34  0.26  0.60 
10  5.34  0.34  0.48  0.82 
50  5.15  0.33  1.69  2.01 
150  4.69  0.29  2.74  3.03 
180  4.55  0.28  2.84  3.12 
240  4.27  0.26  2.92  3.18 
300  3.99  0.24  2.88  3.12 
Source: computed 
 
The results show that inflation tax and real revenue from monetization as a percentage 
of GDP reach a maximum of 3.18 percent of GDP at an inflation rate of 240 percent. For 
higher inflation rates, the negative impact of rising inflation on base money more than 
offsets the direct effect of higher inflation rate on monetization. In as much as a real 
possibility exists to use this revenue for deficit financing, this is not an objective but 
rather a ‘side accidental product’ underlying in the policy framework. This is largely due 
to the importance government attaches to macroeconomic stability.  
3.4.3  Inflation Target and Fiscal Stance  
In view of the debt strategy described in the methodology and expected revenue from 
monetization,  Table  3  shows  the  financeable  deficit  for  a  given  inflation  rate.  The 
financeable deficit is then compared with the actual deficit to yield the required change. 
From the table, if the debt is to grow at most at the rate of GDP then the results indicate 
that real domestic financing should not exceed 0.33 percent of GDP, while real foreign 
financing should not exceed 2 percent of GDP.  
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0  0.33  2.05  0.34  2.72  2.74  0.02 
5  0.33  2.05  0.59  2.97  2.74  -0.23 
7  0.33  2.05  0.60  2.98  2.74  -0.24 
10  0.33  2.05  0.82  3.20  2.74  -0.46 
50  0.33  2.05  2.01  4.39  2.74  -1.65 
150  0.33  2.05  3.03  5.41  2.74  -2.67 
180  0.33  2.05  3.12  5.50  2.74  -2.76 
240  0.33  2.05  3.18  5.56  2.74  -2.82 
300  0.33  2.05  3.12  5.50  2.74  -2.76 
Source: Computed 
 
Given these restrictions and the country’s macroeconomic management goal of having 
inflation  at  no  more  than  5  percent,  then  the  actual  deficit  is  consistent  with  the 
financeable deficit. Indeed during the liberalization period, on average the fiscal stance 
has been consistent with the inflation target. To attain the inflation target, however, 
domestic borrowing has been used in pursuing monetary policy of liquidity control. 
 
Specifically, in assessing the different means of financing the deficit, consistency of the 
fiscal stance has been achieved at the cost of unsustainable domestic debt in relation to 
macroeconomic targets. While the consistent domestic debt strategy estimated is 0.33 
percent of GDP, the actual domestic borrowing on average is 1.2 percent of GDP. But 
foreign debt financing and revenue from monetization were consistent with the overall 
strategy. This is because though Uganda relied more on foreign financing, the grant 
element of this financing was above 60 percent. 
 
Hence,  a  more  contentious  question  for  macroeconomic  management  involves  the 
domestic debt which has accumulated at an unsustainable rate, thus, increasing the 
domestic real interest rates. Issuing domestic debt at such a high real interest rates will 
allow lower money growth but at the cost of future increases in debt service obligations 
and  thus  future  budget  deterioration.    According  to  van  Wijnbergen  (1989),  a  debt 
strategy that sacrifices future budget balance for current monetary restraint is likely to 
fuel  inflationary  expectations  even  if  favourable  external  shocks  allow  a  temporary 
decline in prices. This in turn will keep nominal interest rates high, fuelling a vicious 
circle of high interest rates, high public debt service, increasing budget deficits, high 
inflationary expectations, and back to high interest rates. Of course high interest rates 
then  limit  private  sector  investment  (crowded  out  by  government)  which  in  turn 
deteriorates long term sustainable growth, thus, affecting the country’s ability to service 
its liabilities; as discussed in the next sub-section.   14
3.4.4  The Impact of GDP Growth 
The greater is GDP growth, the greater the debt that can be sustained by an economy. 
Table 4 shows the simulated results of the financeable deficit at 3, 6 and 9 percent real 
GDP growth. On average the economy has grown at about 6 percent over the past 15 or 
so  years.  Real  GDP  growth  rates  were  high  in  the  1990s  but  stagnated  around  5.5 
percent in the early 2000s, recovering to above 6 percent in 2006/07. From the table, if 
GDP  growth  rates  fall,  then  the  financeable  deficit  declines  making  fiscal  stance  to 
become  unsustainable,  while  if  the  growth  rates  rise  then  the  economy  is  able  to 
accommodate larger deficits without jeopardizing macroeconomic targets. 
 
Table 4: Impact of GDP Growth 
 
Inflation (%) 




Growth  9 %GDP Growth  Actual Deficit 
0  1.49  2.72  4.46  2.74 
5  1.74  2.97  4.71  2.74 
7  1.83  2.98  4.80  2.74 
10  1.96  3.20  4.93  2.74 
50  3.17  4.39  6.12  2.74 
150  4.21  5.41  7.13  2.74 
180  4.31  5.50  7.22  2.74 
240  4.37  5.56  7.27  2.74 
300  4.32  5.50  7.20  2.74 
 
Table 5 shows the required deficit reduction for given GDP growth rates. At a growth 
rate of 3 percent, it takes an inflation rate target of above 10 percent, for the actual 
deficit to be consistent with the inflation target. While, at 9 percent GDP growth, the 
economy  is  able  to  accommodate  higher  real  deficits  and  stay  in  line  with  the 
macroeconomic target. Thus the negative effects of the deficit on the economy need to 
be minimized. 
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Table 5: Required Deficit Reduction at a given GDP Growth and Inflation 
 
Inflation (%) 






Growth  Actual Deficit 
0  1.25  0.02  -1.72  2.74 
5  1.00  -0.23  -1.97  2.74 
7  0.91  -0.24  -2.06  2.74 
10  0.78  -0.46  -2.19  2.74 
50  -0.43  -1.65  -3.38  2.74 
150  -1.47  -2.67  -4.39  2.74 
180  -1.57  -2.76  -4.48  2.74 
240  -1.63  -2.82  -4.53  2.74 
300  -1.58  -2.76  -4.46  2.74 
400  -1.37  -2.53  -4.22  2.74 
500  -1.06  -2.20  -3.89  2.74 
Source: Computed 
 
However, just like long run sustainable GDP growth needs a conducive foreign exchange 
policy which favours exports; also the long term sustainability of deficits will be affected 
by the exchange rate movements. This is because the exchange rate will on one hand 
affect the cost of servicing foreign debt, while on the other hand it will affect the ability 
to service the debt. 
3.4.5  The impact of Exchange Rate Movements 
A challenge faced by the macroeconomic management is to convert foreign aid into 
local currency without increasing money supply to a level that is inconsistent with the 
price stability goal of the country. Owing to the underdeveloped nature of the financial 
market, though, only a limited range of instruments are available to the central bank in 
Uganda (Atingi, 2000). This has meant that in addition to using of foreign exchange sales 
to convert foreign aid into local currency, it has also been used as a tool of monetary 
policy. Indeed, there has been a remarkable increase in the foreign exchange operations 
with the net sales “…rising from 5 million dollars in 1998/99 to the programmed level of 
almost 254 million dollars in 2001/02” (Bank of Uganda, 2003, pg 12). This has been 
especially  so  in  cases  where  issuance  of  treasury  bills  is  deemed  to  exert  upward 
pressure on domestic interest rates. Hence macroeconomic managers must balance the 
issue  of  domestic  debt  with  foreign  exchange  trading  in  the  market.  Trading  in  the 
foreign exchange market at the margin will increase the amount of foreign currency 
available and  thus appreciate the exchange rate. Table 6, shows the likely effect of 
exchange rate movements on the fiscal stance. An appreciation of the exchange rate is 
likely to reduce foreign indebtedness and interest payments of the country and vice 
versa. Indeed the results indicate that the deficit declines by 0.02 percent with a 10 
percent appreciation while it increases by 0.04 percent with 10 percent depreciation. 
However, while this may sound appealing to debt managers, it has long term effects on 
sustainability of debt. This arises from the Dutch disease effect on exports and hence   16
the  capacity  for  the  country  to  repay  its  debt.  Hence  for  long  run  sustainability  a 
depreciation which favours exports, boosts the economy’s capacity to repay its debt and 
leads to economic growth, should be sought. 
 




Debt(% of GDP) 
Real Foreign 
Net Debt(% of 
GDP) 
Real Foreign Net Debt 




A. Appreciation (%)         
10  50.40  44.11  0.73  2.72 
30  39.20  34.31  0.57  2.69 
50  28.00  24.51  0.41  2.64 
B. Depreciation (%)         
10  61.60  53.92  0.89  2.79 
20  67.20  58.82  0.97  2.81 
30  72.80  63.72  1.06  2.84 
50  84.00  73.52  1.22  2.88 
C.Actual (%)         
0  59.40  53.50  0.87  2.74 
Source: Computed. 
 
For macroeconomic management, the challenge then is to trade in the foreign exchange 
market without exerting too much appreciation pressure on the market.    17
4.  INTERACTION OF SELECTED MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES: A STRUCTURAL 
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE APPROACH (SVAR) 
 
4.1  Model Specification and Identification of Restrictions 
The standard framework to investigate the role of innovations on the economy and 
their possible determination is the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model (Sims, 
1982; 1986; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Shapiro and Watson, 1988; and Blanchard and 
Quah,  1989).  Sims  (1980)  VAR  framework  made  it  possible  to  direct  both  relative 
meaning and the dynamic effect of various disturbances on macroeconomic variables. 
Its main criticism has been that is a largely theoretical identification mechanism with 
little  economic  foundation  (see  Cooley  and  Leroy,  1985).  The  SVAR  methodology 
improves on the identification mechanism by imposing restrictions based on economic 
theory. The methodology is generally focused on how innovations to one endogenous 
variable  affect  other  endogenous  variables  and  the  direction  of  instant  correlation 
between innovation variables can be assessed. It is also possible to determine whether 
the shocks have temporary or permanent effects on the endogenous variables. 
 
To this end, the empirical method applied in this study is a small open economy SVAR. 
The model is composed of a system of five equations representing five endogenous 
variables depicting the relationship between the main macroeconomic indicators of the 
growth rates of GDP (ggdp), prices (gcpi), nominal money supply (gmny) (M2), nominal 
interest rates (gir) and local currency movements (gner). 
 
The process of estimating a SVAR involves a number of steps. First, a reduced VAR using 
OLS ensuring that an appropriate specification of the lag length is done to ensure no 
serial  correlation  from  the  residuals.  Second,  is  the  identification  of  the  structural 
parameters of the model by imposing theory based restrictions. Third, in the case where 
shocks are assumed to have temporary effects the short run restriction SVAR model is 
used, however, where shocks are assumed to have permanent effects, the long run 
SVAR is employed. In the final step the orthogonalised and structural response function 
and forecast-error variance decomposition are analyzed. 
 
Before, embarking on the econometric tests, an analysis of the time series properties of 
the series is undertaken. The unit root tests based on the KPSS and DF-GLS tests suggest 
that all the variables are stationary (Table 7). 
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Table 7: Unit Root Tests 
 
Variable  KPSS  DF-GLS 
ir  0.2028***  -1.6332 
gir  0.0705***  -10.5634*** 
gmny  0.1948***  -14.7879*** 
gner  0.2575***  -10.7270*** 
gcpi  0.1147***  -10.4157*** 
ggdp  0.4824**  -2.8856*** 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the series are non-stationary for the DF-GLS while the series are non-stationary for the KPSS. The 
symbols *** indicate that the null rejected at 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence intervals, while ** indicate only at 5 and 10 percent 
and * indicates at only 10 percent interval. The critical values are data based calculated by E-VIEWS-5 and differ depending on lags 
and whether the trend has been included. 
 
Without imposing a number of restrictions, the SVAR cannot be identified both in the 
short run and the long run. Thus to identify the underlying structural model, restrictions 
are made based on economic theory. Table 8 shows the identifying restrictions of the 
short run model. The identification of the real sector (prices and GDP) is obtained by 
assuming that monetary sector variable affect the real sector with lag. In addition the 
real sector variables have no effect in identification of shocks in the monetary sector. 
We further assume that nominal exchange rate does not contemporaneously affect real 
GDP, real output does not contemporaneously affect prices, nominal variables have no 
contemporaneous  effect  on  interest  rate,  and  nominal  interest  rate  has  no 
contemporaneous effect on the exchange rate. Thus in identifying the short run model 
two over identifying restrictions are imposed. 
 
Table 8: Contemporaneous Restrictions 
 
Variables  gner  gnir  gmny  ggdp  gcpi 
gner  1  0  0  0  0 
gnir  0  1  0  0  0 
gmny  B1  B2  1  0  0 
ggdp  0  B3  B4  1  0 
gcpi  B5  B6  B7  B8  1 
 
Apart from identification of structural shocks by the short run parameter restrictions, 
there is an alternative approach of imposing restrictions on the long run parameters for 
the  structural  disturbances.  The  method  of  long  run  SVAR  analysis  introduced  by 
Shapiro and Watson, 1988; and Blanchard and Quah, 1989 is based on the hypothesis 
that the long run effect of particular shocks on a particular variable is restricted. Table 9, 
provides the identifying restrictions for the long run model. It is assumed that money 
and interest rates influence GDP. In addition, exchange rate shocks affect both real and 
monetary variables in the long run. Stable prices are good for long run macroeconomic 
stability and thus economic growth. Thus the long run model is exactly identified. 
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Table 9: Long run Restrictions 
 
Variables  gner  gnir  gmny  ggdp  gcpi 
gner  C1  0  0  0  0 
gnir  C2  C3  0  0  0 
gmny  C4  C5  C6  0  0 
ggdp  C7  C8  C9  C10  0 
gcpi  C11  C12  C13  C14  C15 
 
In estimating a reduced form VAR special attention needs to be put on ensuring an 
appropriate specification of the lag length so as to ensure no serial correlation from the 
residuals. Table 10 provides the lag length selection criteria. Based on the FPE, AIC and 
HQ criterion, the Table suggests an appropriate lag length of two. 
 
 
Table 10: Lag Selection Criteria 
 
 Lag  LogL  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
0   2403.825   2.44e-19  -28.66856  -28.48186  -28.59278 
1   2528.963   7.35e-20  -29.86782   -29.21435*  -29.60259 
2   2574.930    5.72e-20*   -30.11892*  -28.99869   -29.66424* 
3   2593.554   6.19e-20  -30.04257  -28.45557  -29.39844 
4   2609.516   6.93e-20  -29.93432  -27.88055  -29.10074 
5   2614.045   8.91e-20  -29.68916  -27.16863  -28.66613 
6   2648.162   8.07e-20  -29.79834  -26.81104  -28.58586 
7   2669.518   8.54e-20  -29.75470  -26.30064  -28.35277 
8   2678.236   1.06e-19  -29.55971  -25.63888  -27.96833 
9   2686.348   1.32e-19  -29.35747  -24.96987  -27.57664 
10   2696.349   1.63e-19  -29.17783  -24.32347  -27.20755 
11   2711.763   1.90e-19  -29.06303  -23.74190  -26.90330 
12   2741.633   1.87e-19  -29.12135  -23.33346  -26.77217 
 
Thus the results of the estimated reduced form VAR with the appropriate 2 lags are 
provided in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Reduced Form VAR Results 
 
  GNER  GIR  GMNY  GGDP  GCPI 
GNER(-1)   0.214460   1.206755  -0.244208   0.006981   0.208996 
   (0.07490)   (0.54556)   (0.20577)   (0.00922)   (0.05709) 
  [ 2.86326]  [2.21195]  [-1.18681]  [ 0.75700]  [3.6608] 
           
GNER(-2)   0.082118  -0.192929  -0.024997   0.002393  -0.020840 
   (0.07505)   (0.79711)   (0.20617)   (0.00924)   (0.10730) 
  [ 1.09423]  [-0.24203]  [-0.12125]  [ 0.25896]  [-0.19423] 
           
GIR(-1)  -0.010824   0.078983   0.008154  -0.000165   0.004080 
   (0.00521)   (0.07658)   (0.01981)   (0.00089)   (0.01031) 
  [-2.07754]  [ 1.03140]  [ 0.41167]  [-0.18554]  [ 0.39578] 
           
GIR(-2)   0.017235  -0.152537  -0.008886  -0.000188  -0.004592 
   (0.00718)   (0.07627)   (0.01973)   (0.00088)   (0.01027) 
  [ 2.40017]  [-2.0005]  [-0.45047]  [-0.21258]  [-0.44727] 
           
GMNY(-1)  -0.052028   0.176608  -0.074280  -0.001972   0.011154 
   (0.02525)   (0.26815)   (0.06936)   (0.00311)   (0.03609) 
  [-2.06084]  [ 0.65862]  [-1.07100]  [-0.63460]  [ 0.30902] 
           
GMNY(-2)   0.013775   0.106975  -0.450842  -3.84E-06   0.026908 
   (0.02553)   (0.27113)   (0.07013)   (0.00314)   (0.03650) 
  [ 0.53963]  [ 0.39456]  [-6.42903]  [-0.00122]  [ 0.73729] 
           
GGDP(-1)  -1.060476  -2.151717   4.691375   0.472749   0.323753 
   (0.46784)   (6.03132)   (1.55997)   (0.06991)   (0.81185) 
  [-2.26675]  [-0.35676]  [ 3.00736]  [ 6.76238]  [ 0.39878] 
           
GGDP(-2)   1.306885  -1.731869  -0.297255   0.455455   0.040093 
   (0.57539)   (6.11153)   (1.58071)   (0.07084)   (0.82265) 
  [ 2.27131]  [-0.28338]  [-0.18805]  [ 6.42949]  [ 0.04874] 
           
GCPI(-1)  -0.100952   0.462380   0.030303   0.005018   0.093869 
   (0.05432)   (0.57698)   (0.14923)   (0.00669)   (0.03766) 
  [-1.85842]  [ 0.80138]  [ 0.20306]  [ 0.75038]  [ 2.49254] 
           
GCPI(-2)  -0.029598   0.741729   0.110774   0.004894  -0.016842 
   (0.05490)   (0.58310)   (0.15081)   (0.00676)   (0.07849) 
  [-0.53915]  [ 1.27205]  [ 0.73451]  [ 0.72408]  [-0.21458] 
 Log likelihood   2706.152       
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The  results  in  Table  11  suggest  a  weak  relationship  between  real  GDP  and  price 
movements. The impact of real interest rates on prices is insignificant as well. Whereas 
changes  in  money  would  be  expected  to  impact  positively  on  the  price  level,  the 
coefficients  are  found  to  be  insignificant.  Indeed  the  significant  predictive  power  is 
expected from movements in the exchange rate market and the expected price level.  
 
The results suggest a significant predictive power of developments in the exchange rate 
and feedback from past values of inflation.  However, it is likely that better predictions 
could be achieved by imposing economic based restrictions to identify short run and 
long run models of the SVAR.  
 
4.2  Contemporaneous structural model 
 
Following the Sims and Zha (2002) procedure for estimation of short run parameters, a 
limited  time-variation  in  the  coefficients  of  the  model  is  used  in  order  to  observe 
changes in monetary policy design and inflation targeting. Table 12 provides results of 
the  contemporaneous  model  identified  by  applying  some  economic  theory  based 
restrictions (these are discussed earlier on). Note that the likelihood ratio test statistic 
for  null  hypothesis  of  over-identifying  restrictions  does  not  reject  the  restrictions 
implying that they are statistically valid. 
 
The coefficients of the variables exchange rate, GDP and money are expected to have a 
positive effect on the price level in the short run while the variable interest rate is 
expected to negatively affect price changes. Unfortunately, the structural coefficients 
are statistically insignificant.   22
Table 12: Estimated Coefficients of Contemporaneous variables
8 
 
  Coefficient  z-Statistic  Prob.   
C(3)  -0.038622  -0.186846   0.8518 
C(4)   -0.003924   -0.201945   0.8400 
C(6)   0.000871   1.003275   0.3157 
C(7)  -0.003312  -0.986643   0.3238 
C(9)   0.052129   0.488776   0.6250 
C(10)  -0.004215  -0.419242   0.6750 
C(11)  0.032715  0.841344   0.4002 
C(12)   0.426978   0.491797   0.6229 
C(1)   0.008511   18.81489   0.0000 
C(2)   0.090538   18.81489   0.0000 
C(5)   0.023405   18.81489   0.0000 
C(8)   0.001045   18.81489   0.0000 
C(13)   0.012075   18.81489   0.0000 
Log likelihood    2674.204     
Chi-square(2)    0.642548  Probability   0.7252 
 
4.3  Long run Structural Model 
The  long  run  SVAR  model  estimation  shows  the  permanent  effect  of  monetary  and 
exchange rate policies as well as the contribution of real output to  price level. The 
results of the long run structural model are provided in Table 13. All parameters in the 
price level equation are statistically significant and bear the expected signs. Money, 
GDP, exchange rate, interest rate and expected inflation have a positive permanent 
effect on the price level. However, the major variations in the price level are expected to 
come from inflationary expectations and exchange rate variations, since they have the 
highest parameter coefficients. With respect to growth targeting the results seem to 
support  the  classical  dichotomy  hypothesis  showing  a  weak  link  between  monetary 
aggregates and output. 
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Table 13: Estimated Coefficients of Long run variables 
  Coefficient  z-Statistic  Prob.   
C(1)   0.012685   18.81489   0.0000 
C(2)   0.022996   3.570735   0.0004 
C(3)  -0.015177  -5.314660   0.0000 
C(4)  -0.004695  -4.476003   0.0000 
C(5)  -0.003627  -2.981958   0.0029 
C(6)   0.084124   18.81489   0.0000 
C(7)   0.002100   0.767156   0.4430 
C(8)   0.000249   0.244221   0.8071 
C(9)   0.002029   1.696394   0.0898 
C(10)   0.036384   18.81489   0.0000 
C(11)   0.012314   15.77806   0.0000 
C(12)   0.008982   8.228573   0.0000 
C(13)   0.005656   18.81489   0.0000 
C(14)   0.003268   3.382163   0.0007 
C(15)   0.012644   18.81489   0.0000 
Log likelihood    2674.526     
 
4.4  Stability and Autocorrelation Tests 
In order to improve on the reliability of the VAR/SVAR estimates one needs to ascertain 
whether  the  model  satisfies  the  stability  and  autocorrelation  conditions.  Table  14 
provides  a  stability  check.  The  results  suggest  that  the  model  satisfies  the  stability 
condition since no root lies outside of the unit circle (Figure 1). 
 
In addition the Lagrange multiplier test for absence of serially correlated disturbances in 
the VAR and SVAR specifications is undertaken. Table 15 shows that the null of no serial 
correlation cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 14: Eigenvalue Stability Test 
 
     Root  Modulus 
 0.953108   0.953108 
-0.034638 - 0.661962i   0.662867 
-0.034638 + 0.661962i   0.662867 
-0.467258   0.467258 
 0.391822   0.391822 
 0.044639 - 0.336772i   0.339718 
 0.044639 + 0.336772i   0.339718 
-0.024131 - 0.238764i   0.239980 
-0.024131 + 0.238764i   0.239980 
-0.064266   0.064266 
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition.   24
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Table 15: VAR Residual Serial Correlation Langrage Multiplier Tests 
 
Lags  LM-Stat  Prob 
1   27.79136   0.3175 
2   29.31158   0.2511 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
 
4.5  Impulse Response Analysis 
 
The impulse response analysis describes how innovations (shocks) to one variable affect 
another  variable  after  a  given  period  of  time.  The  estimated  orthogonolised  and 
structural responses from both the short run and long run models are presented in 
Figure 2.  
 
The graphs reveal results which are very similar to the models analyzed so far. It is 
shown that innovations in the exchange rate policy have a negative cumulative impact 
on  the  price  level,  while  all  other  innovation  impact  positively  on  the  price  level. 
However,  the  largest  shock  is  from  inflationary  expectation  shocks.  Considering 
innovations on output, exchange rate depreciation shocks output negatively, this could 
be due to the influence of imported capital goods on domestic production. In addition, 
interest  rates  shock  output  negatively,  supporting  the  investment  crowding  out 
hypothesis.  
 
4.6  Forecast Error Variance Decomposition  
 
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD/SFEVD) provides information about 
the dynamic relationships among jointly analyzed VAR and SVAR system variables. They 
measure  the  relative  importance  of  shocks  arising  from  one  variable  in  explaining   25
another variable. Table 16 provides the Cholesky forecast error variance decomposition 
results. 
 
As expected the largest importance is placed on each variable in explaining itself. In the 
exchange rate model other than the importance of the variable itself, the interest rate 
and inflationary shocks are important in explaining the variation, these shocks stabilize 
after  four  periods.  In  the  interest  rate  model,  in  addition  to  interest  rate,  it  is  the 
nominal exchange rate and inflationary shocks which are important in explaining the 
variations the model. The effect of these shocks stabilizes after the fifth period. For the 
money  supply  model  shocks  are  expected  for  output  variations  which  provide 
permanent cumulative effect on money supply. Shocks on output are expected from 
money supply and nominal exchange rate. Considering the price level variations, the 
important shocks are expected from nominal exchange rate. In general however, all 
variables to a large extent are exogenous with the exception of nominal exchange rate.   26
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Table 16 : Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
           
           
 Period  Gner/gner  Gner/gir  Gner/gmny  Gner/ggdp  Gner/gcpi 
           
           
 1   100.0000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   92.74733   1.753828   1.385847   2.260115   1.852883 
 3   89.69625   3.961081   1.372619   2.171921   2.798128 
 4   88.60122   4.369842   1.665610   2.362673   3.000655 
 5   88.58939   4.368897   1.670744   2.366579   3.004392 
 6   88.50505   4.366960   1.704689   2.419792   3.003512 
 7   88.47214   4.365305   1.709593   2.449240   3.003721 
 8   88.43283   4.363541   1.721016   2.477824   3.004793 
 9   88.41527   4.362668   1.720837   2.496742   3.004480 
 10   88.39502   4.361725   1.720855   2.518558   3.003845 
           
           
 Period  gir/gner  Gir/gir  Gir/gmny  Gir/ggdp  Gir/gcpi 
           
           
 1   0.000000   100.0000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   1.431577   97.91362   0.254968   0.014455   0.385383 
 3   1.469422   96.91059   0.274822   0.058013   1.287151 
 4   1.469400   96.85816   0.327049   0.058470   1.286918 
 5   1.468125   96.80448   0.332397   0.065974   1.329026 
 6   1.468157   96.78712   0.346300   0.068529   1.329890 
 7   1.468143   96.78385   0.347799   0.070237   1.329974 
 8   1.468149   96.78039   0.350111   0.071394   1.329955 
 9   1.468118   96.77837   0.350147   0.073427   1.329940 
 10   1.468090   96.77600   0.350970   0.074964   1.329972 
           
           
 Period  Gmny/gner  Gmny/gir  Gmny/gmny  Gmny/ggdp  Gmny/gcpi 
           
           
 1   0.019715   0.023031   99.95725   0.000000   0.000000 
 2   0.892017   0.196074   95.24432   3.631422   0.036164 
 3   0.743920   0.198805   94.98882   3.440867   0.627585 
 4   0.935551   0.307824   94.61635   3.482322   0.657954 
 5   0.912228   0.302304   94.43629   3.649137   0.700040 
 6   0.917992   0.334099   93.92161   4.131339   0.694959 
 7   0.916040   0.331194   93.69082   4.337324   0.724626 
 8   0.934041   0.333533   93.51735   4.487719   0.727360 
 9   0.933889   0.333592   93.32277   4.684267   0.725477 
 10   0.932117   0.335231   93.12116   4.885740   0.725748 
           
           
 Period  Ggdp/gner  Ggdp/gir  Ggdp/gmny  Ggdp/ggdp  Ggdp/gcpi 
           
           
 1   0.000107   0.545942   0.543878   98.91007   0.000000 
 2   0.204345   0.484459   0.945102   98.09857   0.267526 
 3   0.436283   0.356863   1.101220   97.41550   0.690139 
 4   0.640159   0.319252   1.101582   97.16842   0.770586 
 5   0.759010   0.296470   1.108389   97.01935   0.816777 
 6   0.856369   0.284169   1.148162   96.86068   0.850618 
 7   0.930720   0.272533   1.167584   96.74961   0.879552 
 8   0.989660   0.264348   1.173000   96.67411   0.898886 
 9   1.034205   0.258143   1.180474   96.61321   0.913965 
 10   1.070595   0.253195   1.189988   96.55967   0.926556 
           
  Ggdp/gner  Ggdp/gir  Ggdp/gmny  Ggdp/ggdp  Ggdp/gcpi 
 Period  Gcpi/gner  Gcpi/gir  Gcpi/gmny  Gcpi/ggdp  Gcpi/gcpi 
           
           
 1   0.140780   0.088222   0.434141   0.135555   99.20130 
 2   2.031579   0.121263   0.525224   0.199129   97.12280 
 3   2.070150   0.452467   0.576224   0.224472   96.67669 
 4   2.066283   0.469596   0.615371   0.377364   96.47139 
 5   2.068733   0.491903   0.636504   0.440422   96.36244 
 6   2.071426   0.491517   0.638696   0.510988   96.28737 
 7   2.071236   0.491178   0.638571   0.577152   96.22186 
 8   2.070581   0.491075   0.643094   0.641557   96.15369 
 9   2.070660   0.490882   0.644815   0.693727   96.09992 
 10   2.070696   0.490692   0.644530   0.741651   96.05243 
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5.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The major fiscal policy issues currently being debated in Uganda revolve around the 
possibility of increasing fiscal space and the trade-off between macroeconomic stability 
on the one hand and the need to finance strategic investments and social sector targets 
on the other. In the face of a narrow tax base, the country’s strategy since the early 
1990s  has  been  to  run  a  budget  deficit  (financed  to  a  significant  extent  by  donor 
inflows).  Whereas  aid  funded  deficits  appear  to  be  benign,  budget  deficits  beyond 
‘certain  financeable  limits’  negate  the  possibility  of  attaining  other  objectives  of 
macroeconomic policy.  
 
This paper sought to make a contribution  to the ongoing debate in  Uganda on  the 
possibility  of  increasing  fiscal  space  versus  the  trade-off  between  macroeconomic 
stability  on  the  one  hand  and  the  need  to  finance  some  pertinent  development 
challenges  on  the  other.  We  also  examined  both  short  term  as  well  as  long  term 
interactions between selected macroeconomic aggregates with particular focus on the 
relationship between money growth and price changes. 
The results show that domestic debt financing of the deficit has been on an upward 
trend on account of liquidity management pressures stemming from increased donor 
inflows whereas the real foreign debt on the other hand has declined over the study 
period reflecting an increase in grants and debt relief from the HIPC Initiative and the 
recent Multilateral Debt Relief International (MDRI). In addition, whereas the overall 
deficit excluding grants has increased, the real net operational deficit of government has 
actually reduced owing to increased foreign grants. Unfortunately though, increased 
reliance on donor support has complicated macroeconomic management. The results 
also suggest that there is a real potential of increasing revenue up to some feasible level 
from  monetization.  Overall,  the  actual  deficit  was  shown  to  be  consistent  with  the 
financeable deficit.  
 
The contemporaneous structural vector autoregression show a weak causation from 
growth  in  monetary  aggregates  to  price  changes,  but  the  link  between  changes  in 
monetary aggregates and prices becomes stronger in the long run. Our evidence also 
points to a strong relationship between price changes on the one hand and exchange 
rate depreciation, and past inflation outcomes on the other.  
 
A contentious question for macroeconomic management involves the domestic debt 
which  has  accumulated  at  an  unsustainable  rate,  thus,  increasing  the  domestic  real 
interest rates. From a policy perspective, issuing domestic debt at such high real interest 
rates will allow lower money growth but at the cost of future increases in debt service 
obligations and thus future budget deterioration. This calls for caution not to sacrifice 
future budget balance for current monetary restraint since this would fuel inflationary 
expectations. This in turn would keep nominal interest rates high, fuelling a vicious circle 
of  high  interest  rates,  high  public  debt  service,  increasing  budget  deficits,  high   29
inflationary expectations, and back to high interest rates. Of course high interest rates 
then limit private sector investment which in turn deteriorates long term sustainable 
growth, thus, affecting the country’s ability to service its liabilities. 
 
The  dilemma  is  to  determine  the  best  options  that  reduce  deficits  but  without 
necessarily  affecting  social  service  delivery  as  well  as  investments  in  critical  public 
infrastructure. Viable options (in view of a narrow tax base owing to a large informal 
sector) lie in enacting laws and putting in place an appropriate institutional framework 
for the functioning of public private partnerships so as to relieve government of part of 
the responsibilities for public goods provision. With regard to strategic investments in 
infrastructure  and  capital  development  government  could  consider  employing  more 
‘technical’  procedures  to  guide  project  selection  and  implementation.  The  ability  to 
carefully  select  and  implement  strategic  investments  and  doing  so  in  a  transparent 
manner would not only constrain ‘bad’ decision making but would maximise returns and 
synergies among the selected projects.  
 
At the same time, there is a real potential of increasing revenue from monetization at 
the expense of some modest level of inflation. The trade-off between macroeconomic 
stability  and  higher  deficits  falls  with  higher  rates  of  economic  growth.  Relaxing 
infrastructural  constraints  and  improving  the  general  business  climate  (through 
monetisation up to some feasible level) has the potential to result in higher rates of 
economic growth that can enable the economy to accommodate higher real deficits and 
at the same time stay in line with goals for other macroeconomic targets. Even in this 
case,  strategic  investments  in  infrastructure  and  capital  development  need  to  be 
selected  and  implemented  on  the  basis  of  ‘technical’  procedures  and  done  so 
transparently, not only to constrain ‘bad’ decision making but to maximise returns and 
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Variable list and data sources 
D  =  non-interest deficit  
i  =  nominal domestic interest rate 
* i   =  nominal foreign interest rate 
B   =  domestic debt stock 
* B   =  foreign debt stock 
* NFA   =  net foreign assets 
E   =  exchange rate (domestic in terms of foreign units) 
B &   =  change in domestic debt stock 
* B &   =  change in foreign debt stock 
g C D &   =  net credit to government 
W N &   =  change in central banks net worth 
M  =  nominal base money 
b  =  real domestic debt stock 
r  =  domestic real interest rate 
d  =  real non-interest deficit 
r*  =  foreign real interest rate 
nfa  =  real net foreign assets 
P  =  general price level 
m  =  real base money 
gdp  =  real GDP 
dd  =  domestic debt 
fd  =  foreign debt 
e  =  real exchange rate 
ir  =  nominal interest rate 
gir  =  growth rate of nominal interest rate 
gmny  =  growth rate of nominal money supply 
gner  =  growth rate of nominal exchange rate 
gcpi  =  growth rate of the consumer price index 
ggdp  =  growth rate of gdp 
g  =  growth rate of real gdp 
 
The study used quarterly data for the period from 1992 to 2006. Data that were used to 
analyze  fiscal  consistency  were  sourced  from  the  Macroeconomics  Department  of 
Ministry  of  Finance,  Planning  and  Economic  Development  (MFPED)  and  was 
complimented by Bank of Uganda (BoU) sources. Data that were used to analyze the 
interaction  of  selected  macroeconomic  aggregates  (such  as  interest  rates,  money 
supply, exchange rates and CPI) were sourced from BoU. Data for GDP which is not 
available on quarterly basis was interpolated.    34
 
 
Appendix Table 1: DOLS Co-integrating Relationship 
 
  lrgdp   lsr  linf  lreer  lfir  Constant  Prob>F 













Notes: t-Statistic in parenthesis generated by Newey-west standard errors 
Appendix Table 2: Results of the Restricted Short-run Model for Money 
dlrm2   Coefficient  Std. Err.  t-Statistic  P>|t| 
dlrm_1   -0.3296**  0.1388  -2.38  0.022 
dlrm_2   -0.3330***  0.1032  -3.23  0.002 
dlrgdp_1   0.3725*  0.1539  2.42  0.041 
 dlsr_1   -0.0644***  0.0180  -3.59  0.001 
dlsr_2  -0.0352*  0.0180  -1.96  0.057 
  dlsr   -0.0560***  0.0152  -3.67  0.001 
inf_2   0.0548***  0.0161  3.40  0.002 
dlfir_2  -0.0730**  0.0336  -2.17  0.036 
 dlfir   -0.0613*  0.0322  -1.90  0.064 




-0.3812***  0.1034  -3.69  0.001 
d1  0.0092**  0.0044  2.07  0.044 
d2  0.0163***  0.0045  3.59  0.001 
_cons   0.0047  0.0073  0.65  0.519 
 
F( 13, 41) =6.70; Prob > F =0.0000; R-squared = 0.6800;Adj R-squared =  0.5786 
LM test; Prob > chi2=0.3945; H0: no ARCH effects 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test; Prob > chi2=0.3504; H0: no serial correlation 
Durbin's alternative test; Prob > chi2=0.4221; H0: no serial correlation 
Ramsey RESET test; Prob > F = 0.9563; Ho:  model has no omitted variables   35
Appendix Table 3: Debt Trends 
 
Year        Debt Service Inc Relief    HIPC Relief    MDRI Relief  
 Debt Service excl 
Relief  
 HIPC Relief (Effect 
%)  
 MDRI Relief (Effect 
%)  
 Total Relief (Effect 
%)  
     Debt Stock    Principal    Interest    Principal  
 
Interest    Principal  
 
Interest    Principal    Interest    Principal  
 
Interest    Principal  
 
Interest    Principal  
 
Interest  
 1992/93  
        2,637.20          108.33          30.20               -               -                -                -          108.33          30.20               -                -                 -                -               -                -    
 1993/94  
        2,999.30          131.14          27.50               -               -                -                -          131.14          27.50               -                -                 -                -               -                -    
 1994/95  
        3,386.92          114.55          36.11               -               -                -                -          114.55          36.11               -                -                 -                -               -                -    
 1995/96  
        3,515.78          101.57          40.68               -               -                -                -          101.57          40.68               -                -                 -                -               -                -    
 1996/97  
        3,660.23          118.45          37.46               -               -                -                -          118.45          37.46               -                -                 -                -               -                -    
 1997/98  
        3,631.60          121.05          33.58               -               -                -                -          121.05          33.58               -                -                 -                -               -                -    
 1998/99  
 pre-
HIPC  
      3,495.61  
       120.47          43.27               -               -                -                -          120.47          43.27               -                -                 -                -               -                -    
 1999/00  
 pre-
HIPC  
      3,576.94  
         96.90          36.53               -               -                -                -            96.90          36.53         58.23  
     
54.89               -                -        (58.23) 
   
(56.48) 
 2000/01  
 pre-
HIPC  
      3,391.53  
       107.66          38.44         62.69       21.10              -                -            44.97          16.73         62.36  
     
53.78               -                -        (62.36) 
   
(53.78) 
 2001/02  
 pre-
HIPC  
      3,799.37  
         99.97          33.65         62.34       18.10              -                -            37.63          15.56         67.38  
     
52.76               -                -        (67.38) 
   
(52.76) 
 2002/03  
 pre-
HIPC  
      4,211.39  
       110.82          35.09         74.67       18.51              -                -            36.15          16.58         50.88  
     
55.48               -                -        (50.88) 
   
(55.48) 
 2003/04  
 pre-
HIPC  
      4,464.92  
       133.49          34.28         67.92       19.02              -                -            65.58          15.26         41.09  
     
44.05               -                -        (41.09) 
   
(44.04) 
 2004/05  
 pre-
HIPC  
      4,421.66  
       154.14          38.56         63.33       16.99              -                -            90.81          21.58         28.97  
     
37.44         11.42  
       
0.71      (40.39) 
   
(37.44) 
 2005/06  
 pre-
HIPC  
      4,464.38  
       152.21          42.60         44.10       15.95        17.38  
       
0.30          90.73          26.65         23.63  
     
37.39         41.20  
     
36.94      (64.83) 
   
(74.33) 
 2006/07  
 pre-
HIPC  
      1,468.08  
       142.29          42.46         33.62       15.87        58.62  
     
15.69          50.05          10.90         22.03  
     
37.34         44.07  
     
39.21      (66.10) 
   
(76.54) 
 2007/08  
 pre-
HIPC         1,792.60          152.57          44.72         33.62       16.70        67.23  
     
17.53          51.72          10.49         44.32  
     
46.64         32.23  
     
25.62      (56.41) 




                             
 